Emotion in Reinforcement Learning Agents and Robots: A Survey by Moerland, Thomas M. et al.
”Machine Learning” manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Emotion in Reinforcement Learning Agents and
Robots: A Survey.
Thomas M. Moerland · Joost Broekens ·
Catholijn M. Jonker
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract This article provides the first survey of computational models of emo-
tion in reinforcement learning (RL) agents. The survey focuses on agent/robot
emotions, and mostly ignores human user emotions. Emotions are recognized
as functional in decision-making by influencing motivation and action selection.
Therefore, computational emotion models are usually grounded in the agent’s deci-
sion making architecture, of which RL is an important subclass. Studying emotions
in RL-based agents is useful for three research fields. For machine learning (ML)
researchers, emotion models may improve learning efficiency. For the interactive
ML and human-robot interaction (HRI) community, emotions can communicate
state and enhance user investment. Lastly, it allows affective modelling (AM) re-
searchers to investigate their emotion theories in a successful AI agent class. This
survey provides background on emotion theory and RL. It systematically addresses
1) from what underlying dimensions (e.g., homeostasis, appraisal) emotions can be
derived and how these can be modelled in RL-agents, 2) what types of emotions
have been derived from these dimensions, and 3) how these emotions may either
influence the learning efficiency of the agent or be useful as social signals. We also
systematically compare evaluation criteria, and draw connections to important RL
sub-domains like (intrinsic) motivation and model-based RL. In short, this survey
provides both a practical overview for engineers wanting to implement emotions
in their RL agents, and identifies challenges and directions for future emotion-RL
research.
Keywords Reinforcement learning · Emotion · Motivation · Agent · Robot
1 Introduction
This survey systematically covers the literature on computational models of emo-
tion in reinforcement learning (RL) agents. Computational models of emotions are
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2 Moerland et al.
usually grounded in the agent decision-making architecture. In this work we focus
on emotion models in a successful learning architecture: reinforcement learning,
i.e. agents optimizing some reward function in a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
formulation. To directly avoid confusion: the topic does not imply the agent should
‘learn its emotions’, i.e. emotions are rather hooked on characteristics of the MDP
(like value and transition functions), and may for example well persist after learn-
ing has converged.
One may question why it is useful to study emotions in machines at all. The
computational study of emotions is an example of bio-inspiration in computational
science. Many important advancements in machine learning and optimization were
based on biological principles, such as neural networks, evolutionary algorithms
and swarm-based optimization (Russell et al, 1995). An example encountered in
this survey is homeostasis, a concept closely related to emotions, and a biological
principle that led researchers to implement goal switching in RL agents.
The study of emotions in learning agents is useful for three research fields.
First, for the machine learning (ML) community, emotions may benefit learning
efficiency. For example, there are important connections to the work on (intrinsi-
cally) motivated RL. Second, researchers working on interactive machine learning
and human-robot interaction (HRI) may benefit from emotions to enhance both
transparency (i.e. communicate agent internal state) and user empathy. Finally,
from an affective modelling (AM) perspective, where emotions are mostly studied
in cognitive agents, RL agents provide the general benefits of the MDP formula-
tion: these agents require few assumptions, can be applied to a variety of tasks
without much prior knowledge, and, allow for learning. This also gives AM re-
searchers access to complex, high-dimensional test domains to evaluate emotion
theories.
Emotion is an important part of human intelligence (Johnson-Laird and Oat-
ley, 1992; Damasio, 1994; Baumeister et al, 2007). On the one hand, emotion
has been defined as a response to a significant stimulus - characterized by brain
and body arousal and a subjective feeling - that elicits a tendency towards moti-
vated action (Calvo et al, 2014; Frijda et al, 1989). This emphasizes the relation
of emotions with motivation and action. On the other hand, emotions have also
been identified as complex feedback signals used to shape behaviour (Baumeister
et al, 2007; Broekens et al, 2013). This view emphasizes the feedback function of
emotion. The common ground in both: 1) emotions are related to action selection
mechanisms and 2) emotion processing is in principle beneficial to the viability
of the individual. As an illustration, Damasio (1994) showed that people with
impaired emotional processing (due to brain damage) show failures in work and
social life. These observations connecting emotions to action selection and adap-
tive decision-making sparked interest in the computer science community as well,
mainly following the initial work by Can˜amero (1997b) and Gadanho and Hallam
(1998).
We wrote this survey for two reasons. First, while the topic of emotion in RL
agents has received attention for nearly 20 years, it appears to fall in between
the machine learning and affective modelling communities. In particular, there is
no framework connecting the variety of models and implementations. Although
Rumbell et al (2012) compared emotion models in twelve different agents, their
work does not provide a full survey of the topic, nor does it focus on agents
with a learning architecture. Our main aim is to establish such a framework,
Emotion in Reinforcement Learning Agents and Robots: A Survey. 3
hoping to bridge the communities and potentially align research agendas. As a
second motivation, this survey is also useful to engineers working on social agents
and robots. Emotion has an important functional role in social interaction and
social robotics (Fong et al, 2003). Our survey is also a practical guideline for
engineers who wish to implement emotional functionality in their RL-based agents
and robots.
As a final note, the term ‘reinforcement learning’ may be misleading to readers
from a cognitive AI or psychological background. RL may reminisce of ‘instru-
mental conditioning’, with stimulus-response experiments on short time-scales.
Although indeed related, RL here refers to the computational term for a successful
class of algorithms solving Markov Decision Processes by sampling and learning
from data. MDPs (introduced in Section 2.4) provide a generic specification for
short-term and long-term sequential decision-making problems with minimal as-
sumptions. Note that many cognitive AI approaches, that usually employ a notion
of ‘goal’, are also expressible in MDP formulation by defining a sparse reward
function with positive reward at the goal state.
The structure of this review is as follows. First, Section 2 provides the necessary
background on emotion and reinforcement learning from psychology, neuroscience
and computer science. Section 3 discusses the survey’s methodology and proposed
taxonomy. Subsequently, Sections 4-6 contain the main results of this survey by
systematically categorizing approaches to emotion elicitation, emotion types and
emotion functionality. Additionally, the comparison of evaluation criteria is pre-
sented in (Section 7). The survey ends with a general discussion of our findings,
highlights some important problems and indicates future directions in this field
(Section 8).
2 Background
As many papers included in this survey build upon psychological (2.1) and neu-
roscientific (2.2) theories of emotion, this section provides a high-level overview
of these fields. Subsequently, we position our work in the computer science and
machine learning community (2.3). We conclude these preliminaries by formally
introducing computational reinforcement learning (2.4).
2.1 Psychology
We discuss three dominant psychological emotion theories: categorical, dimen-
sional, and componential theories (see also Lisetti and Hudlicka (2014)).
Categorical emotion theory assumes there is a set of discrete emotions forming
the ‘basic’ emotions. These ideas are frequently inspired by the work by Ekman
et al (1987), who identified the cross-cultural recognition of anger, fear, joy, sad-
ness, surprise and disgust on facial expressions. In an evolutionary perspective,
each basic emotion can be considered as an elementary response pattern, or ac-
tion tendency (Frijda et al, 1989). For example, fear has the associated action
tendency of avoidance, which helps the organism to survive a dangerous situation,
accompanied by a negative feeling and prototypical facial expression. However, the
concept of ‘basic’ emotions remains controversial within psychology, as is reflected
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in the ongoing debate about which emotions should be included. The number of
emotions to be included ranges from 2 to 18, see Calvo et al (2014).
Dimensional emotion theory (Russell, 1978) assumes an underlying affective
space. This space involves at least two dimensions; usually valence (i.e. posi-
tive/negative evaluation) and arousal (i.e. activation level) (Russell and Barrett,
1999). For example, fear is a highly arousing and negative affective state. The
theory was originally developed as a ‘Core affect’ model, i.e. describing a more
long-term, underlying emotional state. Osgood et al (1964) orginally added dom-
inance as a third dimension, resulting in the PAD (pleasure, arousal, dominance)
model. Dimensional models have difficulty separating emotion categories such as
anger and disgust, which is a common critique on the theory.
Finally, componential emotion theory, best known as cognitive appraisal the-
ory (Lazarus, 1991), considers emotions as the results of evaluations (appraisals) of
incoming stimuli according to personal relevance. Some examples of frequently oc-
curring appraisal dimensions are valence, novelty, goal relevance, goal congruence
and coping potential. Distinct emotions relate to specific patterns of appraisal
activation. For example, anger is a result of evaluating a situation as harmful
to one’s own goals with the emotion attributed to the responsible actor and at
least some feeling of power. Some well-known appraisal theories that have been
a basis for computational models are the OCC model (named after the authors
Ortony, Clore and Collins) (Ortony et al, 1990), the component process theory
of emotions (CPT) (Scherer et al, 2001), and the belief-desire theory of emotions
(BDTE) (Reisenzein, 2009). Although cognitive appraisal theories describe the
structure of emotion well, they are limited with respect to explaining where ap-
praisals themselves come from, what the function of emotion is in cognition and
intelligence, and how they are related to evolution.
Note that the presented theories focus on different aspects of emotions. For
example, appraisal theory focuses on how emotions are elicited, while categorical
emotion models focus on action tendencies, i.e. the immediate function of emo-
tions. Some consider emotions to precede action selection, while others focus on
emotions as feedback signals (Baumeister et al, 2007). In this survey emotions are
considered in a reward-based feedback loop, which involves both emotion elicita-
tion and function.
2.2 Neuroscience
Affective responses and their relation to behaviour and learning have also been ex-
tensively studied in neuroscience; for a survey see (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008).
We discuss theories by LeDoux, Damasio and Rolls. The work by LeDoux (2003)
mainly focussed on the role of the amygdala in fear conditioning. LeDoux iden-
tified that incoming sensory stimuli can directly move from thalamus to amyg-
dala, thereby bypassing the previously assumed intermediate step through the
neo-cortex. As such, the work showed that emotional responses may also be elicited
without neo-cortical reasoning.
Damasio (1994) took a different perspective on rational emotions through the
‘somatic marker hypothesis’. He proposes that emotions are the result of bodily
sensations, which tell the organism that current sensations (i.e. events) are benefi-
cial (e.g. pleasure) or harmful (e.g. pain). The somatic marker is therefore a signal
Emotion in Reinforcement Learning Agents and Robots: A Survey. 5
that can be interpreted as feedback about the desirability of current and imagined
situations. The somatic marker hypothesis has been interpreted in terms of RL as
well (Dunn et al, 2006).
Later work by Rolls shifted the attention from the amygdala to the orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC) (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008) Imaging studies have impli-
cated the OFC in both reinforcement and affect, with direct input connections
of most sensory channels (taste, olfactory, visual, touch), while projecting to sev-
eral brain areas involving motor behaviour (striatum) and autonomic responses
(hypothalamus) (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). Also, single neuron studies have
shown that visual and taste signals (the latter being a well-known primary rein-
forcer) converge on the same neurons (Rolls and Baylis, 1994), coined ’conditional
reward neurons’. Earlier work already identified ’error neurons’, which mainly re-
spond when an expected reward is not received (Thorpe et al, 1983).
Together, these theories suggest that emotions are closely linked to reward pro-
cessing. These ideas are implicitly reflected in part of the reinforcement learning-
based implementations in this survey. These ideas are also reflected in Rolls’ evolu-
tionary theory of emotion (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008), which identifies emotions
as the results of primary reinforcers (like taste, affiliative touch, pain) which spec-
ify generic goals for survival and reproductive success (like food, company and
body integrity). According to Rolls, emotions exclusively emerge from these goal-
related events. This view is also compatible with the cognitive appraisal view that
emotions are the result of stimuli being evaluated according to their goal/need rel-
evance. However, in cognitive appraisal theory the ’goal’ is defined at a different
level of abstraction.
2.3 Computer Science
Affective modelling is a vibrant field in computer science with active subfields
(Calvo et al, 2014), including work on affect detection and social signal processing
(Vinciarelli et al, 2012; Calvo and D’Mello, 2010), computational modelling of
affect in robots and virtual agents (Marsella et al, 2010), and expression of emotion
in robots and virtual agents (Ochs et al, 2015; Paiva et al, 2015; Lhommet and
Marsella, 2015). Since this survey focusses on affective modelling, in particular
in RL-based agents, we provide some context by discussing emotions in different
agent architectures, in particular symbolic and (non-RL) machine learning-based.
One of the earliest symbolic/cognitive architectures was Velasquez’ Cathexis
model (Velasquez, 1998). It incorporated Ekman’s six emotions in the pet robot
Yuppy, which later also formed the basis for the well-known social robot Kismet
(Breazeal, 2003). Several well-known symbolic architectures have also incorporated
emotions, either based on categorical emotions (Murphy et al, 2002), somatic
marker hypothesis (Laird, 2008), or appraisal theories (EMIB (Michaud, 2002),
EMA (Marsella and Gratch, 2009) and LIDA (Franklin et al, 2014)). Although
symbolic/cognitive architecture approaches are capable of solving a variety of AI
tasks, they are limited with respect to learning from exploration and feedback in
unstructured tasks.
In contrast, machine learning implementations focus on learning, as the agent
should gradually adapt to its environment and task. The dominant research direc-
tion in this field is reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which we
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formally introduce in the next section. There are however other machine learning
implementations that incorporate emotions. Some examples include agents based
on evolutionary neural networks (Parisi and Petrosino, 2010), the free-energy prin-
ciple (Joffily and Coricelli, 2013), Bayesian models (Antos and Pfeffer, 2011) or
entropy (Belavkin, 2004).
Finally, we want to stress that the focus of this review is on agent emotion,
i.e. how it is elicited and may influence the agent’s learning loop. A related but
clearly distinct topic is how human emotion may act as a teaching signal for this
loop. Broekens (2007) showed human emotional feedback speeds up agent learning
in a grid-world task compared to a baseline agent. There are a few other examples
in this direction (Hasson et al, 2011; Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann, 2013),
but in general the literature of emotion as a teaching signal is limited. Although
the way in which humans actually tend to provide feedback is an active research
topic (Thomaz and Breazeal, 2008; Knox et al, 2012, 2013), it remains a question
whether emotions would be a viable channel for human feedback. We do not further
pursue this discussion here, and put our focus on agent emotions in RL agents.
2.4 Computational Reinforcement Learning
Computational reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Wiering
and Van Otterlo, 2012) is a successful approach that enables autonomous agents
to learn from interaction with their environment. We adopt a Markov Decision
Process (MDP) specified by the tuple: {S,A, T, r, γ}, where S denotes a set of
states, A a set of actions, T : S × A → P (S) denotes the transition function,
r : S × A × S → R denotes the reward function and γ ∈ (0, 1] denotes a discount
parameter. The goal of the agent is to find a policy pi : S → P (A) that maximizes
the expected (infinite-horizon) discounted return:
Qpi(s, a) = Epi,T
{ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at, st+1)|s0 = s, a0 = a
}
=
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s, a)
[
r(s, a, s′) + γ
∑
a′∈A
pi(s′, a′)Qpi(s′, a′)
]
(1)
where we explicitly write out the expectation over the (possibly) stochastic policy
and transition function. The optimal value function is defined as
Q?(s, a) = max
pi
Qpi(s, a) (2)
from which we can derive the optimal policy
pi?(s) = argmax
a∈A
Q?(s, a) (3)
There are several approaches to learning the optimal policy. When the envi-
ronmental dynamics T (s′|s, a) and reward function r(s, a, s′) are known, we can
use planning algorithms like Dynamic Programming (DP). However, in many ap-
plications the environment’s dynamics are hard to determine. As an alternative,
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we can use sampling-based methods to learn the policy, known as reinforcement
learning.
There is a large variety of RL approaches. First, we can separate value-function
methods, which try to iteratively approximate the cumulative return specified in
equation (1), and policy search, which tries to directly optimize some parametrized
policy. Policy search shows promising results in real robotic applications (Kober
and Peters, 2012). However, most work in RL utilizes value-function methods, on
which we also focus in this survey.
Among value-function methods we should identify model-free versus model-
based approaches. In model-free RL we iteratively approximate the value-function
through temporal difference (TD) learning, thereby avoiding having to learn the
transition function (which is usually challenging). Well-known algorithms are Q-
learning (Watkins, 1989), SARSA (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994) and TD(λ)
(Sutton, 1988). The update equation for Q-learning is given by:
Q(s, a) = Q(s, a) + α
[
r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)
]
(4)
where α specifies a learning rate. With additional criteria for the learning and
exploration parameters we can show this estimation procedure converges to the
optimal value function (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Model-based RL (Hester and Stone, 2012b) is a hybrid form of planning (like
DP) and sampling (like TD learning). In model-based RL, we approximate the
transition and reward function from the sampled experience. After acquiring knowl-
edge of the environment, we can mix real sample experience with planning updates.
We will write M = {Tˆ , rˆ} to denote the estimated model. Note that a model is de-
rived from the full agent-environment interaction history at time-point t, as given
by gt = {s0, a0, s1, a1, s2, ...st−1, at−1, st}.
A final aspect we have not yet discussed is the nature of the reward func-
tion. Traditional RL specifications assume an external reward signal (known as an
‘external Critic’). However, as argued by Chentanez et al (2004), in animals the
reward signal is by definition derived from neuronal activations, and the Critic
therefore resides inside the organism. It therefore also incorporates information
from the internal environment, making all reward ‘internal’. Singh et al (2010)
identifies two types of internal reward: extrinsic internal and intrinsic internal (we
will omit ‘internal’ and simply use extrinsic and intrinsic from now on). Extrin-
sic reward is related to resources/stimuli/goals in the external world (e.g. food),
possibly influenced by internal variables (e.g. sugar level). In RL terms, extrin-
sic reward explicitly depends on the content of the sensory information (i.e. the
observed state). On the contrary, intrinsic reward is not dependent on external
resources, but rather derived from the agent-environment history g and current
model M . An example of intrinsic reward in animals is curiosity. Intrinsic reward
is domain-independent, i.e. curiosity is not related to any external resource, but
can happen at any state (dependent on the agent history g). In contrast, extrinsic
reward for food will never occur in domains where food does not occur. Intrinsic
motivation has been identified to serve a developmental role to organisms.
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3 Survey structure and methodology
We intended to include all research papers in which reinforcement learning and
emotion play a role. We conducted a systematic Google Scholar search for ’Emo-
tion’ AND ’Reinforcement Learning’ AND ’Computational’, and for ’Emotion’
AND ’Markov Decision Process’. We scanned all abstracts for the joint occurrence
of emotion and learning in the proposed work. When in doubt, we assessed the full
article to determine inclusion. Moreover, we investigated all papers citing several
core papers in the field, for example, Gadanho and Hallam (2001), Salichs and
Malfaz (2012), Broekens et al (2007a) and Marinier and Laird (2008). This re-
sulted in 52 papers included in this survey. A systematic overview of these papers
can be found in Table 9 and 10.
The proposed taxonomy of emotion elicitation, type and function is shown in
Table 1, also stating the associated subsection where each category is discussed.
The elicitation and function categories are also visually illustrated in Figure 1, a
figure that is based on the motivated RL illustration (with internal Critic) intro-
duced in Chentanez et al (2004). Figure 1 may be useful to refer back to during
reading to integrate the different ideas. Finally, for each individual paper the reader
can verify the associated category of emotion elicitation, type and function through
the colour coding in the overview Table 9.
There is one important assumption throughout this work, which we want to
emphasize here. We already introduced the distinction between extrinsic and in-
trinsic motivation in RL at the end of the last section. Throughout this work, we
parallel extrinsic motivation with homeostasis (Section 4.1), and intrinsic moti-
vation with appraisal (Section 4.2). The extrinsic/intrinsic distinction is clearly
part of the RL literature, while homeostasis and especially appraisal belong to the
affective modelling literature. We group these together, as the concept of extrinsic
motivation is frequently studied in combination with homeostasis, while intrinsic
motivation shows large overlap with appraisal theory. We will identify this over-
lap in the particular sections. However, the point we want to stress is that the
concepts are not synonyms. For example, it is not clear whether some intrinsic
motivation or appraisal dimensions also show homeostatic dynamics (a point at
which we tend to disagree with Singh et al (2010)). However, a full discussion of
the overlap and difference moves towards psychology, and is beyond the scope of
our computational overview. We merely identify the overlap we observed in com-
putational implementations, and therefore discuss both extrinsic/homeostasis and
intrinsic/appraisal as single sections.
Table 1 Overview of categories in emotion elicitation, emotion type and emotion function.
The number before each category identifies the paragraph where the topic is discussed. Emotion
elicitation and function are also visually illustrated in Figure 1.
Emotion elicitation Emotion type Emotion function
4.1 Homeostasis and
extrinsic motivation
4.2 Appraisal and intrinsic
motivation
4.3 Value/reward-based
4.4 Hard-wired
5.1 Categorical
5.2 Dimensional
6.1 Reward modification
6.2 State modification
6.3 Meta-learning
6.4 Action selection
6.5 Epiphenomenon
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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of motivated reinforcement learning based on Chentanez et al
(2004). Although traditional RL assumes an external Critic (to provide the reward signal), this
actually happens inside the brain of real-world organisms. Thereby the Critic also incorporates,
apart from external sensations, internal motivations to determine the current reward and state.
Motivations have been derived from homeostatic variables and/or internal models. The Critic
then feeds the state and reward to the Agent. The Agent usually learns a value function
(Adaptive Critic) and determines the next action (Actor). Note that ordinary RL, in which
the reward is a fully external stimulus, is still a specific case of this scheme (with the Critic
as identity function). Emotion elicitation (green) has been associated to A) Homeostasis and
extrinsic motivation (paragraph 4.1), B) Appraisal and intrinsic motivation (4.2), C) Reward
and value function (4.3) and D) Hard-wired connections from sensations (4.4). Subsequently,
the elicited emotion may also influence the learning loop. Emotion function (blue) has been
linked to I) Reward modification (6.1), II) State modification (6.2), III) Meta-learning (6.3),
IV) Action selection (6.4) and finally as V) Epiphenomenon (6.5).
4 Emotion elicitation
We identify four major categories of emotion elicitation: extrinsic/homeostatic
(4.1), intrinsic/appraisal (4.2), value function and reward-based (4.3), and finally
hard-wired (4.4).
10 Moerland et al.
4.1 Homeostasis and extrinsic motivation
Several computational implementations of emotions involve homeostatic variables,
drives and motivations. The notion of internal drives originates from the Drive
Reduction Theory developed by Hull (1943), which identifies drive reduction as a
central cause of learning. These innate drives are also known as primary reinforcers,
as their rewarding nature is hard-wired in our system (due to evolutionary benefit).
An example of a homeostatic variable is energy/sugar level, which has a temporal
dynamic, an associated drive when in deficit (hunger) and can be satiated by an
external influence (food intake). The reader might now question why machines
even need something like ‘hunger’. However, for a robot the current energy level
shows similarity to human sugar levels (and body integrity and pain show similarity
to a robot’s mechanical integrity, etc.). Thereby, homeostasis is a useful concept
to study in machines as well (see also the remark about bio-inspiration in the
Introduction). There is a vast literature on motivated reinforcement learning, see
e.g. Konidaris and Barto (2006) and Cos et al (2013), mainly for its potential to
naturally switch between goals. Early implementations of these ideas outside the
reinforcement learning framework were by Can˜amero (1997a,b).
We denote a homeostatic variable by ht, where t identifies the dependency
of this variable on time. The organism’s full physiological state is captured by
Ht = {h1,t, h2,t..hN,t}, where hi,t indicates the ith homeostatic variable. Each
homeostatic variable has a certain set point H? = {h?1, h?2..h?N} (Keramati and
Gutkin, 2011). Furthermore, each homeostatic variable is affected by a set of ex-
ternal resources, associated to a particular action or state. For example, a partic-
ular homeostatic variable may increase upon resource consumption, and slightly
decrease with every other action (Konidaris and Barto, 2006). More formally, de-
noting resource consumption by a¯ and the presence of a resource by s¯, a simple
homeostatic dynamic would be
hi,t+1 =
{
hi,t + ψ(st, at) if at ∈ a¯, st ∈ s¯
hi,t −  otherwise
(5)
for a resource effect of size ψ(st, at). We can also explicitly identify a drive as the
difference between the current value and setpoint, i.e. di,t = |h?i − hi,t| (Cos et al,
2013). The overall drive of the system can then be specified by
Dt =
N∑
i=1
θidi,t =
N∑
i=1
θi|h?i − hi,t| (6)
where we introduced θi to specify the weight or importance of the i-th homeostatic
variable. Most examples take the absolute difference between current value and
setpoint (i.e. the L1 norm) as shown above. However, we can consider the space
of homeostatic variables H ∈ RN and in principle define any distance function in
this space with respect to the reference point H? (see e.g. Figure 2 for a Euclidean
distance example).
The weight of each homeostatic variable (θi) does not need to be fixed in time.
For example, Konidaris makes it a non-linear function of the current homeostatic
level hi,t and a priority parameter ρi,t: θi,t = f(hi,t, ρi,t). The former dependence
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Fig. 2 Schematic illustration of homeostasis and drives. The figure shows a two-dimensional
homeostatic space consisting (as an example) of energy (h1) and water level (h2). The set
point (H?) indicates the desired values for the homeostatic variables. At the current timepoint
t the agent’s homeostatic status is Ht (red). The associated drive Dt can be visualize as the
distance to the set point. Note that we use the Euclidean distance for the drive here (i.e. Dt =
||H? −Ht||2), while the text describes the L1-norm example (i.e. Dt = ||H? −Ht||1, equation
6). We are free to choose any distance metric in homeostatic space. After taking an action
the new homeostatic status becomes Ht+1 (green), in this case bringing both homeostatic
levels closer to their set point. The difference between the drives at both timepoints has been
associated to reward and joy (see Section 6.1). Figure partially based on Keramati and Gutkin
(2011).
allows priorities (i.e. rewards) to scale non-linearly with the sensory input levels (an
idea reminiscent of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)). The priority
parameters ρi,t can be estimated online, for example assigning more importance
to resources which are harder to obtain (i.e. that should get priority earlier). As a
final note on homeostatic RL systems, note that internal variables need to be part
of the state-space as well. One can either include all homeostatic variables and
learn generic Q-values, or include only the dominant drive and learn drive-specific
Q-values (Konidaris and Barto, 2006).
The connection between drives/homeostasis and emotions is partially reflected
in Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), stating that emotions
are the result of bodily sensations. In general, we identify two ways in which
homeostatic systems have been used to elicit emotions. The first elicits categorical
emotions from a subset of homeostatic variables, while the second derives an overall
well-being W from the sum of the homeostatic dimensions.
One of the first RL systems deriving emotions from homeostasis was by Gadanho
and Hallam (1998, 2001). They describe an extensive set of internal variables
(drives), including e.g. hunger (rises per timestep in lack of resources), pain (rises
with collisions), restlessness (rises with non-progress) and temperature (rises with
high motor usage). Emotions are related to these physiological variables, e.g. hap-
piness is derived from the frequent motor use or decreasing hunger, sadness from
low energy, fear from collisions (with less sensitivity if the agent is hungry or rest-
less), and anger from high restlessness. Similar ideas are put forward by Coutinho
et al (2005), who specifies a more biological homeostasis: blood sugar (increases
with food intake), endorphine (increases with play), energy (increases with bed
rest), vascular volume (increases with water intake) and body integrity (decreases
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Table 2 Overview of most frequently investigated homeostatic dimensions, their associated
drive in case of deficit, and the papers in which example implementations can be found.
Homeostasic variable Drive Papers
Food/energy Hunger (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001), (Salichs and
Malfaz, 2012), (Coutinho et al, 2005)
(Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Goerke, 2006)
(Tanaka et al, 2004)
Water level Thirst (Salichs and Malfaz, 2012) (Coutinho et al,
2005)
Body integrity Pain (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001) (Coutinho
et al, 2005) (Tanaka et al, 2004) (Lee-
Johnson et al, 2010)
Activity Restlessness (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001) (Coutinho
et al, 2005) (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012)
Energy (movement) Sleep/tiredness (Salichs and Malfaz, 2012) (Coutinho et al,
2005) (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Goerke,
2006) (Tanaka et al, 2004)
Social interaction Loneliness (Salichs and Malfaz, 2012)
with obstacle collision). Similar examples of homeostatic emotions can be found
in Von Haugwitz et al (2012), Tanaka et al (2004) and Goerke (2006).
A second group of implementations first defines the overall well-being (W ). An
example of a well-being specification is
Wt = K −Dt = K −
N∑
i=1
θi|h?i − hi,t| (7)
where K denotes a reference value. Compared to the previous paragraph, now all
internal variables (instead of subsets) are combined into a single emotion. Some
papers leave the specification of well-being as their emotion (Gadanho, 2003).
Others actually identify the positive or negative difference in well-being as happy
and unhappy (Salichs and Malfaz, 2012) or ‘hedonic value’ (Cos et al, 2013).
In conclusion, there have been numerous approaches to homeostatic systems
in emotional implementations. A summary of some of the most frequently en-
countered homeostatic dimensions is shown in Table 2. Although most papers
use slightly different specifications for their homeostatic dimensions, it is usually
a matter of labelling that does not affect the underlying principle. Homeostatic
variables provide a good way to naturally implement goal and task switching. The
implementation of this functionality usually involves reward modification, which
is covered in Section 6.1.
4.2 Appraisal and intrinsic motivation
Appraisal theory is an influential psychological emotion theory (see Section 2).
Appraisals are domain independent elements that provide (affective) meaning to
a particular stimulus. As such, they are a basis for emotion elicitation, as different
combinations of appraisal dimensions have different associated emotions. Examples
of appraisal dimensions are novelty, recency, control and motivational relevance.
These terms of course refer to abstract cognitive concepts, but in RL literature
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they show a large overlap with intrinsic motivation features, being independent of
a specific external resource. Instead, they are functions of the agent-environment
interaction history g and derived model M :
ζj(s, a, s
′) = fj(g,M) (8)
for the jth appraisal variable. Note that the current state and action are actually
included in g, but we emphasize that fj(·) is not a function of the actual content of
any state s (see Section 2.4 for a discussion of the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction).
Rather, fj(·) computes domain-independent characteristics, like ‘recency’ which
may be derived from g, and ‘motivational relevance’ which can be derived by
planning over M .
Intrinsic motivation is an active topic in developmental robotics (Oudeyer and
Kaplan, 2007). Singh et al (2010) shows how incorporating these dimensions as
extra reward provides better task achievement compared to non-intrinsically mo-
tivated agents (see Section 6.1). We discuss two implementations based on these
ideas more extensively: Marinier and Laird (2008) and Sequeira et al (2011). The
work by Marinier and Laird (2008) takes a diverse set of appraisal dimensions
based on Scherer’s appraisal theory (Scherer, 1999). These include both sensory
processing dimensions, like suddenness, intrinsic pleasantness and relevance, and
comprehension and reasoning dimensions, like outcome probability, discrepancy
from expectation, conduciveness, control and power. The implementation by Se-
queira et al (2011) uses a smaller subset of appraisal dimensions: novelty, relevance,
valence and control. Note that these appraisal-based papers only elicit appraisal
dimensions, without specifying categorical or dimensional emotions on top (see
Table 9, i.e. appraisal papers with empty middle column).
We now highlight some appraisal implementations, both to concretize their
specification in MDPs, and illustrate the differences between models. Sequeira
et al (2011) specifies ‘motivational relevance’ as inversely related to the distance
to the goal. If we implement a planning procedure over our model M which returns
an estimated distance dˆ(s, s◦) to the goal node s◦ from our current node s, then the
associated appraisal variable for motivational relevance could be (Sequeira et al,
2011):
ζrelevance(s) =
1
1 + dˆ(s, s◦)
(9)
Similarly, if we denote by c(s) the number of time-steps since node s was last
visited, then we can specify a ‘recency’ feature as (Bratman et al, 2012):
ζrecency(s) = 1− 1
c(s)
(10)
This example intrinsic motivation vector ζ = {ζrelevance, ζrecency} is used in Sec-
tion 6.1 to show its use in reward modification.
There are several more specifications in intrinsic motivation RL literature that
reflect appraisal dimensions. For example, Hester and Stone (2012a) maintain an
ensemble of transition models (by stochastically adding new data to each model)
and derive ‘model uncertainty’ from the KL-divergence (as a measure of the dis-
tance between two probability distributions) between the ensemble model’s pre-
dictions:
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ζuncertainty(s, a) =
∑
i 6=j
DKL
[
Ti(s
′|s, a)‖Tj(s′|s, a)
]
(11)
for all pairs of models i and j in the ensemble. As a second example from their
paper, ‘novelty’ of a state-action pair is identified from the closest L1-distance to
a historical observation:
ζnovelty(s, a) = min
<si,ai>∈g
‖〈s, a〉 − 〈si, ai〉‖1 (12)
Recently, Houthooft et al (2016) derive ‘curiosity/surprise’ from the KL-divergence
between the old and new transition models (i.e. after updating based on the ob-
served transition):
ζcuriosity(s, a, s
′) = DKL
[
T (ω|gt, a, s′)‖T (ω|gt)
]
(13)
where T (ω) denotes the transition model parametrized by ω. Together, Equations
9-13 illustrate how intrinsic motivation and appraisal theory have modelled similar
notions, and gives a short illustration of the variety of concepts that are expressible
in the MDP setting.
It is also important to note that appraisal theory bears similarities to many
‘domain-independent’ heuristics developed in the planning community Russell et al
(1995). These of course include heuristics without a clear psychological or biological
interpretation, but we mainly emphasize the potential for cross-breeding between
different research fields. For example, some appraisal theories partition novelty
into three sub-elements: familiarity, suddenness and predictability (Gratch and
Marsella, 2014). Each of these seem to capture different computational concepts,
and such inspiration may benefit intrinsic motivation and/or planning researchers.
Vice-versa, psychologist could seek for results from the RL or planning literature
to develop and verify psychological theory as well.
There are several other implementations of appraisal dimensions, e.g. by Yu
et al (2015), Lee-Johnson et al (2010), Williams et al (2015), Si et al (2010),
Kim and Kwon (2010), Hasson et al (2011) and Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann
(2013). We also encounter a few explicit social dimensions, like social fairness (Yu
et al, 2015) and social accountability (Si et al, 2010), although the latter for exam-
ple requires some symbolic reasoning on top of the RL paradigm. This illustrates
how current RL algorithms (for now) have trouble learning complex social phenom-
ena. Some of the appraisal systems also include homeostatic variables (Yu et al,
2015). Both Williams et al (2015) and Lee-Johnson et al (2010) do not mention
appraisal in their paper, but their dimensions can be conceptualized as intrinsic
motivation nevertheless.
In summary, some appraisal-based dimensions require cognitive reasoning, and
are harder to implement. However, dimensions like novelty, motivational relevance
and intrinsic pleasantness are frequently implemented (see Table 3). Table 4 pro-
vides a more systematic overview of the actual connections to the RL framework.
These features usually require learned transition functions, recency features or for-
ward planning procedures over the model space, which can all be derived from the
history g. Also note that a single concept may be interpreted in very different ways
(Table 4). For example, control and power have been derived from the transitions
function (Kim and Kwon, 2010), from the number of visits to a state (Sequeira
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Table 3 Overview of frequently investigated appraisal dimensions.
Appraisal dimension Paper
Novelty (Sequeira et al, 2011) (Kim and Kwon, 2010) (Si et al,
2010) (Williams et al, 2015)
Recency (Marinier and Laird, 2008)
Control/Power (Marinier and Laird, 2008) (Sequeira et al, 2011) (Kim
and Kwon, 2010) (Si et al, 2010) (Williams et al, 2015)
Motivational relevance (Marinier and Laird, 2008) (Sequeira et al, 2011) (Has-
son et al, 2011) (Kim and Kwon, 2010) (Si et al, 2010)
(Williams et al, 2015)
Intrinsic pleasantness (Marinier and Laird, 2008) (Sequeira et al, 2011) (Lee-
Johnson et al, 2010)
Model uncertainty (Marinier and Laird, 2008) (Lee-Johnson et al, 2010) (Kim
and Kwon, 2010) (Williams et al, 2015)
Social fairness/attachment (Yu et al, 2015) (Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann, 2013)
Social accountability (Si et al, 2010) (Kim and Kwon, 2010)
Table 4 Overview of the five most frequently investigated appraisal dimensions (columns)
and their specific implementations in six appraisal-based papers (rows). The cell text indicates
which event causes the associated appraisal dimension to be high. Note that both Williams
et al (2015) and Lee-Johnson et al (2010) do not explicitly mention appraisal theory as their
inspiration, but they do derive emotions from dimensions encountered in appraisal theory. Only
the implementation of Marinier and Laird (2008) uses direct sensory information (for control
and intrinsic pleasantness), which would better fit with the hard-wired approach in Section 4.4.
All other specifications rely on (an aggregate of) the agent-environment interaction history,
for example on an estimated transition model T (s′|s, a).
Novelty/
Suddenness
Control/
power
Motivational
relevance
Intrinsic
pleasant-
ness
Model un-
certainty
(Kim and
Kwon,
2010)
Ratio of∑
s′ T (s
′|s, a)2
and T (s′|s, a)
Entropy
reduction
by act sel.
High TD - Low belief
b(s) & high
goal distance
(Lee-
Johnson
et al, 2010)
- - - Low mean
travel time
Mismatch of
model and
obs.
(Marinier
and Laird,
2008)
High time to
last state
visit
Absence of
obstacles
Low dist. to
goal
Absence of
obstacles
Low progress
(Sequeira
et al, 2011)
Low # visits
to state
High #
visits to
state
Low dist. to
goal
Current
reward/
value ratio
-
(Si et al,
2010)
Low T of obs.
transition
Low dist.
to higher
value state
High
absolute
TD
- -
(Williams
et al, 2015)
Unseen/seen
ratio
state-space
High
success/fail
ratio
Part of task
finished
- Low model
accuracy
et al, 2011), from a forward planning procedure (Si et al, 2010) and from the
overall success of the agent (Williams et al, 2015). We encounter a fundamental
challenge in the field here, namely how to translate abstract cognitive concepts to
explicit (broadly accepted) mathematical expressions.
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4.3 Value function and reward
The third branch of emotion elicitation methods in RL focusses on the value and
reward functions. We can generally identify four groups: value-based, temporal
difference-based, average reward-based and reward-based (Table 5).
One of the earliest approaches to sequential decision making based on emotion
was by Bozinovski (1982); Bozinovski et al (1996), who considered emotion to be
the expected cumulative reward (i.e. the state-action value) received from taking
an action in that state. Thereby, Bozinovski actually developed a precursor of
Q-learning grounded in emotional ideas. Other implementations have also consid-
ered emotion as the state value. For example, Matsuda et al (2011) maintains a
separate value function for fear, which is updated when the agent gets penalized.
Recent work by Jacobs et al (2014) considers the positive and negative part of the
state as the hope and fear signal. Another value-based approach is by Salichs and
Malfaz (2012), who model the fear for a particular state as the worst historical
Q-value associated with that state. As such, their model remembers particular bad
locations for which it should be afraid.
A second group of value function related implementations of emotions are based
on the temporal difference error (TD). For Q-learning, the TD is given by
δ = r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a) (14)
There has been extensive research in neuroscience on the connection between
dopamine and the TD. Following these ideas, there have also been implementations
connecting happiness and unhappiness to the positive and negative TD, respec-
tively (Moerland et al, 2016; Jacobs et al, 2014; Lahnstein, 2005). Models based
on the temporal difference are robust against shifting the reward function by a
constant (a trait that is not shared by the models of the first group of this sec-
tion). More recently, Moerland et al (2016) extended these ideas by deriving hope
and fear signals from anticipated temporal differences (through explicit forward
simulation from the current node).
Another branch of emotion derivations base themselves on the average re-
ward. For example, Broekens et al (2007a), Schweighofer and Doya (2003) and
Hogewoning et al (2007) derive a valence from the ratio between short- and long-
term average reward. Shi et al (2012) also derives emotions from the temporal
change in reward function, while Blanchard and Canamero (2005) uses the aver-
age reward. Other implementations interpreted the reward ifself as the emotional
signal (Moren and Balkenius, 2000; Balkenius and More´n, 1998; Ahn and Picard,
2006).
In conclusion, emotions have been related to the value function, temporal dif-
ference error or direct derivative of the reward function (Table 5). Note that some
implementations try to incorporate a time dimensions as well (besides only the
reward or value signal), e.g. Moerland et al (2016), Salichs and Malfaz (2012) and
Broekens et al (2007b).
4.4 Hard-wired
While all three previous groups used internal agent/robot aspects, a final category
specifies hard-wired connections from sensory input to emotions. A first group of
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Table 5 Overview of elicitation methods based on value and/or reward functions. Imple-
mentations are either based on the raw value function, the temporal difference error, some
derivative of an average reward or from the raw reward function.
Method Papers
Value (Bozinovski, 1982; Bozinovski et al, 1996) (Matsuda et al, 2011)
(Jacobs et al, 2014) (Salichs and Malfaz, 2012)
Temporal difference (Moerland et al, 2016) (Jacobs et al, 2014) (Lahnstein, 2005)
Average reward (Broekens et al, 2007a) (Schweighofer and Doya, 2003) (Hogewoning
et al, 2007) (Shi et al, 2012) (Blanchard and Canamero, 2005)
Reward (Moren and Balkenius, 2000; Balkenius and More´n, 1998) (Ahn and
Picard, 2006)
implementations use the detected emotional state of another person to influence
the emotion of the agent/robot (Hoey et al, 2013) (Ficocelli et al, 2015). Hasson
et al (2011) uses facial expression recognition systems to detect human emotion,
while Kubota and Wakisaka (2010) uses human speech input. Note that if these
agent emotions subsequently influence agent learning, then we come very close to
learning from human emotional feedback (as briefly described in Section 2.3).
There are several other implementations that pre-specify sensation-emotion
connections. In general, these approaches are less generic compared to the earlier
categories. Some use for example fuzzy logic rules to connect input to emotions
(Ayesh, 2004). Another example we encountered is the previous emotional state
(at t−1) influencing the current emotional state (Kubota and Wakisaka, 2010). An
example is the Markovian transition model between emotions in (Ficocelli et al,
2015), with similar ideas in (Zhang and Liu, 2009). This is a reasonable idea for
smoother emotion dynamics, but we still categorize it as hard-wired since it does
not explain how initial emotions should be generated.
Finally, there is also overlap with previously described elicitation methods.
For example, Tsankova (2002) derives an emotion (frustration) directly from the
collision detector. This is very similar to some homeostatic specifications, but
Tsankova does not include a body integrity or pain variable (i.e. it is therefore
not a homeostatic system, but the author does make the connection between pain
or non-progress and frustration). In conclusion, the hard-wired emotion elicitation
does not seem to provide us any deeper understanding about emotion generation
in RL agents, but the papers in this category may actually implement ideas from
different elicitation methods.
5 Emotion type
Having discussed the methods to elicit emotions, this section discusses which types
of emotions are specified. We cover both categorical (5.1) and dimensional (5.2)
emotion models. Note however that some appraisal theory-based papers only elicit
appraisal dimensions, without specifically identifying emotions (see Table 9).
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5.1 Categorical
Most papers in the emotion and RL literature elicit categorical emotions. An
overview of the most occurring emotions and their associated papers is presented
in Table 6. Joy (or happiness) is the most implemented emotion by a wide vari-
ety of authors. We did not include the papers that specify a valence dimension
(see Section 5.2), but this could also be interpreted as a happy-sad dimension. A
few papers (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Tanaka et al, 2004) specifically address
Ekman’s six universal emotions (happy, sad, fear, anger, surprise, disgust), while
most papers drop the latter two emotions.
In general, happy, sad, fear and anger have been implemented in all elicitation
categories (homeostatic, appraisal and value-based). However, hope has mainly
been connected to value function based systems. The implementations of hope try
to assess anticipation (by addressing the value function (Jacobs et al, 2014), the
dynamics within a decision cycle (Lahnstein, 2005), or explicitly forward simulat-
ing from the current node towards expected temporal differences (Moerland et al,
2016)). Hope therefore needs a time component, a notion which is not directly
available from for example an extrinsic homeostasis dimension.
An overview of the most often elicited emotions (happy, sad, fear and angry) is
provided in Table 7. The table shows that different elicitation methods have been
associated to similar sets of categorical emotions. For example, anger (fourth col-
umn) has been associated to extrinsic homeostasis (e.g. hunger), intrinsic appraisal
(e.g. non-progress) and reward-based (decreasing received reward) elicitation. Note
that frustration, a closely related emotion, has been associated to obstacle detec-
tion (Tsankova, 2002) and non-progress (Hasson et al, 2011) as well. The other
three emotions in Table 7 have also been associated to each elicitation dimension,
as is easily observed from the colour coding.
Note that Table 7 also shows how different researchers apply different elicitation
methods within one paper (i.e. looking at rows instead of columns now). Moreover,
a few papers even combine elicitation methods for an individual emotion. For
example, Williams et al (2015) derives fear from a combination of pain (extrinsic)
and novelty (intrinsic/appraisal). It is important to realize that the elicitation
methods of the previous section are clearly only a framework. These are not hard
separations, and combining different approaches is clearly possible (and probably
necessary), as these papers nicely illustrate.
Finally, many included papers did not fully specify the implemented connec-
tions between elicitation method and emotion type, making it difficult to replicate
these studies. For example, Von Haugwitz et al (2012) only mentions the con-
nections between homeostatic dimensions and emotions are based on fuzzy logic,
but does not indicate any principles underlying the real implementation. Similar
problems occur in (Tanaka et al, 2004), (Ayesh, 2004) and (Obayashi et al, 2012),
while (Zhou and Coggins, 2002) and (Shibata et al, 1997) leave the implemented
connections unspecified.
5.2 Dimensional
Relative to the number of implementations of categorical emotions, there is a
much smaller corpus of work on dimensional emotions (Table 8). The most im-
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Table 6 Overview of categorical emotion implementations.
Categorical emo-
tion
Paper
Joy/happy (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001) (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Ficocelli
et al, 2015) (Tanaka et al, 2004) (Goerke, 2006) (Yu et al, 2015)
(Lee-Johnson et al, 2010) (Williams et al, 2015) (Hasson et al,
2011) (Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann, 2013) (Salichs and Mal-
faz, 2012) (Cos et al, 2013) (Moerland et al, 2016) (Jacobs et al,
2014) (Lahnstein, 2005) (Shi et al, 2012) (El-Nasr et al, 2000)
(Kubota and Wakisaka, 2010)
Sad/unhappy/distress (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001) (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Ficocelli
et al, 2015) (Tanaka et al, 2004) (Yu et al, 2015) (Lee-Johnson et al,
2010) (Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann, 2013) (Salichs and Mal-
faz, 2012) (Moerland et al, 2016) (Jacobs et al, 2014) (Lahnstein,
2005) (El-Nasr et al, 2000) (Kubota and Wakisaka, 2010)
Fear (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001) (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Tanaka
et al, 2004) (Goerke, 2006) (Yu et al, 2015) (Lee-Johnson et al,
2010) (Williams et al, 2015) (Salichs and Malfaz, 2012) (Moerland
et al, 2016) (Jacobs et al, 2014) (Matsuda et al, 2011) (Shi et al,
2012) (El-Nasr et al, 2000) (Kubota and Wakisaka, 2010)
Anger (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001) (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Ficocelli
et al, 2015) (Tanaka et al, 2004) (Goerke, 2006) (Yu et al, 2015)
(Hasson et al, 2011) (Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann, 2013) (Shi
et al, 2012) (El-Nasr et al, 2000) (Kubota and Wakisaka, 2010)
Surprise (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Tanaka et al, 2004) (Lee-Johnson et al,
2010)
Hope (Moerland et al, 2016) (Jacobs et al, 2014) (Lahnstein, 2005) (El-
Nasr et al, 2000)
Frustration (Hasson et al, 2011) (Huang et al, 2012) (Tsankova, 2002)
plemented dimension is valence. Not surprisingly, valence has mostly been derived
from reward-based elicitation methods (Broekens et al, 2007a) (Ahn and Picard,
2006) (Zhang and Liu, 2009) (Obayashi et al, 2012) (Hogewoning et al, 2007).
It is also connected to a few extrinsic homeostasis papers (Coutinho et al, 2005)
(Gadanho, 2003), but then it is referred to as ‘well-being’. Although this is not
completely the same concept, we group these together here for clarity.
Following the dimensional emotion models of Russell and Barrett (1999) intro-
duced in Section 2.1, the second most implemented dimension is arousal. Arousal
has been connected to extrinsic homeostatic dimensions (e.g. pain and overall
well-being (Coutinho et al, 2005)), appraisal-like dimensions (e.g. continuation of
incoming stimulus (Kuremoto et al, 2013)), and a few hard-wired implementations
(Ayesh, 2004) (Guojiang et al, 2010). Note that some do not use the term arousal
but refer to similar concepts, e.g. relaxation (Coutinho et al, 2005) and restlessness
(Ayesh, 2004). The only paper to extend the valence-arousal space is by Hoey et al
(2013), who also include control.
In general, the dimensional emotion models seem somewhat under-represented
compared to the categorical emotion implementations. Although the implemen-
tation for valence shows some consistency among papers, there is more difficulty
to specify arousal or different emotion dimensions. Nevertheless, the continuous
nature of dimensional emotion models remains appealing from an engineering per-
spective. A possible benefit is the identification of a desirable target area in affec-
tive space, towards which the agent aims to progress (Guojiang et al, 2010).
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Table 7 Overview of four categorical emotion (columns) elicitations for different papers
(rows). The text in each cell specifies the elicitation condition. We observe different cate-
gories of emotion elicitation, i.e. homeostatic (blue, Section 4.1), appraisal (green, 4.2) and
value-based (red, 4.3). We see how single emotions are connected to different elicitation meth-
ods (multiple colours in single column) and how single papers use different elicitation methods
(multiple colours in single row).
Happy/Joy Sad/Distress Fear Anger
(Gadanho and
Hallam, 1998)
High energy Low energy Pain High
restlessness
(low progress)
(Goerke, 2006) All drives low - Homesick &
low energy
Hunger &
homesick &
high energy
(Kim and
Kwon, 2010)
Goal
achievement
No goal
achievement
Pain No progress
(Williams
et al, 2015)
Progress &
control & low
pain
- Pain & novelty -
(Salichs and
Malfaz, 2012)
Positive delta
well-being
Negative delta
well-being
Worst
historical
Q(s,a)
-
(Moerland
et al, 2016)
Positive TD Negative TD Anticipated
negative TD
-
(Shi et al,
2012)
Increasing
positive reward
- Increasing
negative
reward
Decreasing
positive reward
(Yu et al,
2015)
High
well-being
Egoistic agent
& low
well-being
Agent defects
& others
co-orperate
Agent
co-orperates &
others defect
Table 8 Overview of dimensional emotion implementations.
Dimensional
emotion
Paper
Valence (Kuremoto et al, 2013) (Ahn and Picard, 2006) (Zhang and Liu, 2009)
(Broekens et al, 2007a) (Broekens, 2007) (Obayashi et al, 2012) (Hogewon-
ing et al, 2007) (Hoey et al, 2013) (Guojiang et al, 2010) (Coutinho et al,
2005)
Arousal (Kuremoto et al, 2013) (Obayashi et al, 2012) (Ayesh, 2004) (Hoey et al,
2013) (Guojiang et al, 2010) (Coutinho et al, 2005)
Control (Hoey et al, 2013)
6 Emotion function
We now discuss the ways in which emotions may influence the learning loop. It
turns out emotions have been implicated with all main aspects of this loop: Reward
(6.1), State (6.2), Adaptive Critic (6.3) and Actor (6.4). Finally, emotion has also
been studied as an epiphenomenon, i.e. without any effect on the learning loop,
but for example to communicate the learning/behavioural process to other social
companions (6.5). These categories are visualized in Figure 1 (labels I-V). Note
that this Section introduces the ways in which emotion may influence the RL loop
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on a conceptual level. We summarize the resulting effect, for example on learning
efficiency, in Section 7.
6.1 Reward modification
A large group of emotional RL implementations use emotions to modify the reward
function. These approaches add an additive term to the reward function that
relies on emotions (we have only encountered additive specifications). The reward
function is given by
rt = r˜t + r
4
t (15)
where r˜(t) denotes the external reward function and r4(t) an internal reward
based on emotional mechanisms. In the RL community, Eq. 15 is known as re-
ward shaping (Ng et al, 1999). The internal reward can be targeted at maximizing
positive emotions, but is also frequently associated to homeostatic variables or
appraisal dimensions (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for elicitation). However, the gen-
eral underlying principle usually remains that agents seek to maximize positive
emotions and minimize negative emotions.
Homeostasis. For homeostatic systems the reward becomes dependent on the cur-
rent state of the internal homeostatic variables. Some implementations use the
difference in overall well-being,
r4t = Wt −Wt−1 = Dt−1 −Dt (16)
where the step from well-being W to overall drive D naturally follows from Equa-
tion (7). In this specification, the acquisition of food does not provide any reward
if the associated homeostatic variable (e.g. energy/sugar level) is already satiated.
Implementations of the above idea can be found in (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001),
(Salichs and Malfaz, 2012) and (Cos et al, 2013). Variants of this have focussed
on using positive emotions (instead of well-being) as the reinforcement learning
signal, e.g. in (Gadanho and Hallam, 1998) and (Goerke, 2006).
Appraisal-based. Similar ideas are used for appraisal-based reward modifications.
Some examples of appraisal dimension specifications were discussed in Section 4.2,
with some formal examples in Equations 9-13. Appraisal dimensions are related
to generic concepts of the agent history (novelty, recency, consistency of observa-
tions with world model) and expectations with respect to the goal (motivational
relevance, intrinsic pleasantness). Several studies in the intrinsically motivated re-
inforcement learning literature have identified the learning and survival benefit of
these dimensions (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Oudeyer et al, 2007). Some authors
therefore took appraisal theory as an inspiration to develop intrinsic motivation
features.
Specifications in this direction therefore usually take the following form:
r4t =
J∑
j=1
φjζj(gt) (17)
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for J appraisal variables and φj denoting the weight of the j-th appraisal dimen-
sion. We could for example use the two features in Equations 9-10, specifying an
agent that gets rewarded for motivational relevance and recency. Note that ap-
praisal specifications usually do not include the difference with (t − 1), probably
because they are usually assumed not to satiate (i.e. no underlying homeostatic
dynamics). We also note that a reward bonus for novelty (e.g. as in Eq. 12) is in
the RL literature usually referred to as ‘optimism in the face of uncertainty’, i.e.
we want to explore where we have not been yet.
Sequeira et al (2011) actually tries to optimize the vector of weights φ (with
respect to overall goal achievement). In a more recent publication, Sequeira et al
(2014) also extends this work to actually learn the required appraisal dimensions
through genetic programming. Similar ideas can be found in Marinier and Laird
(2008). One of the problems with both implementations is the distance-to-goal
heuristic used by both emotion-based agents, which has access to additional infor-
mation compared to the baseline agent (although the heuristic does not monoton-
ically increase with the actual distance to goal). We discuss the empirical results
of these papers more systematically in Section 7.
6.2 State modification
Emotions have also been used as part of the state-space (learning emotion specific
value functions and policies). An example is the social robot Maggie (Castro-
Gonza´lez et al, 2013). When fear is elicited it becomes part of the state-space
(replacing the dominant drive in a homeostatic system), which makes Maggie
learn fear-specific action values.
Some papers explicitly write Q(s, a, e), where e denotes the emotional state, to
illustrate this dependency (Ahn and Picard, 2006) (Ayesh, 2004). More examples
of such implementations can be found in (Zhang and Liu, 2009) (Ficocelli et al,
2015) (Obayashi et al, 2012) and (Matsuda et al, 2011). Hoey developed a POMDP
variant called Bayesian Affect Control Theory that includes the three-dimensional
emotional space (valence, control, arousal) of a companion (Hoey et al, 2013) and
the agent itself (Hoey and Schro¨der, 2015). There are also implementations that
use reinforcement learning to model the affective state of a human or group (Kim
and Cho, 2015), but note that this is a different setting (i.e. RL to steer human
emotional state instead of agent emotional state).
Using emotion to modify the state can also be seen as a form of representation
learning. There are not many architectures that learn the modification (most hard-
code the emotion elicitation), with the exception of Williams et al (2015). Their
architecture has similarities to the bottle-neck structure frequently encountered
in deep neural network research, for example in (deep) auto-encoders (Goodfellow
et al, 2016). We return to the fully-learned approach in the Discussion (Section
8).
6.3 Meta-learning
The previous two sections showed how emotion has been implicated with determin-
ing both the reward and state, which together can be considered as the (Internal)
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Critic. Afterwards, the state and reward are used to learn a value function, a pro-
cess that is usually referred to as the Adaptive Critic (see Figure 1). The learning
process requires appropriate (and tedious) scaling of learning parameters, most
noteworthy the learning rate α (see Section 2.4).
The connection between emotion and these learning parameters was inspired
by the work of Doya (2000, 2002). He identified neuroscientific grounding for the
connection between several neurotransmitters and several reinforcement learning
parameters. In particular, he proposed connections between dopamine and the
temporal difference error (δ), serotonin and the discount factor (γ), noradrenaline
and the Boltzmann action selection temperature (β) and acetylcholine and the
learning rate (α).
This work inspired both Shi et al (2012) and Von Haugwitz et al (2012) to
implement emotional systems influencing these metaparameters. Shi identifies the
connections joy → δ, anger → β, fear → α and relief → γ, while von Haugwitz
changes only the latter two to surpise → (1− α) and fear → (1− γ).
Recently, Williams et al (2015) also investigated metaparameter steering in
navigation tasks. Together with (Sequeira et al, 2014) they are the only ones
to learn the emotional connections, and then post-characterize the emerged phe-
nomena. Williams trains a classifier connecting a set of primary reinforcers (both
appraisal and homeostasis-based) to the metaparameters of their navigation algo-
rithm. They train two emotional nodes, and only afterwards anthropomorphicized
these. One node learned positive connections to progress and control and nega-
tively to pain and uncertainty, while it caused the robot to increase its speed and
reduce the local cost bias. In contrary, their second node was elicited by pain and
novelty, while it caused the opposite effect of node 1. They afterwards characterized
these nodes as ‘happy’ and ‘fear’, respectively.
6.4 Action selection
The final step of the RL loop involves action selection. This incorporates another
crucial RL challenge, being the exploration/exploitation trade-off. Emotions have
long been implicated with action readiness, and we actually already encountered
two papers steering the Boltzmann action selection temperature β above (as it
is technically also a metaparameter of the RL system). We next focus on those
papers that specifically target action selection.
One branch of research focusses on directly modifying the exploration param-
eter. Broekens et al (2007b,a) has done extensive investigations of the connections
between valence and the exploration/exploitation trade-off. In one implementation
(Broekens et al, 2007a) selection was based on internal simulation, where a valency
determined the threshold for the simulation depth. In another paper (Broekens
et al, 2007b) this valency directly influenced the β parameter in a Boltzmann
action selection mechanism. Schweighofer and Doya (2003) applied small pertur-
bations to the exploration parameters based on emotion, and subsequently kept
the parameters if they performed better. Finally, Hogewoning et al (2007) inves-
tigated a hybrid system of Broekens and Schweighofer, trying to combine their
strengths.
Other papers use emotion to switch between multiple sets of value functions,
thereby effectively determining which set should currently be used for action se-
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lection. For example, both Tsankova (2002) and Hasson et al (2011) use a high
frustration to switch between behaviour. Similarly, Kubota and Wakisaka (2010)
use several emotions to switch between the weighting of different value functions.
For example, happiness leads to exploration by selecting a value function derived
from inverse recency. Note that such a recency feature was used in the appraisal
section described previously, but there it modified the reward function, while now
emotion is used to switch between value functions. Although this technically leads
to similar behaviour, emotion intervenes at a different level.
6.5 Epiphenomenon
The final category of functions of emotions seems an empty one: Epiphenomenon.
Several papers have studied emotion elicitation in RL, without the emotion influ-
encing the learning or behavioural loop. These papers usually focus on different
evaluation criteria as well (see Section 7). Examples of papers that only elicit emo-
tions are (Coutinho et al, 2005), (Goerke, 2006), (Si et al, 2010), (Kim and Kwon,
2010), (Bozinovski, 1982; Bozinovski et al, 1996), (Jacobs et al, 2014), (Lahnstein,
2005) and (Moerland et al, 2016).
There can however still be a clear function of the emotion for the agent in a
social communication perspective (node V in Figure 1). Emotion may communi-
cate the current learning and behavioural process, and also create empathy and
user investment. The potential of emotions to communicate internal state and en-
hance empathy is infrequently evaluated in current reinforcement learning related
emotion literature. This seems a fruitful direction when emotions serve to make
an agent or robot more sociable and likeable.
This concludes our discussion of emotion functions in RL agents. The full
overview is provided in Table 10, which mainly lists the categories per paper. The
most important connections between Sections 4-6 (i.e. column 1 to 3 in Table 9)
were described in the text and tables (e.g. Table 4 and 7).
7 Evaluation
This section systematically addresses the embodiment, test scenario and main
empirical results found in the different papers. A systematic overview of this section
is provided in Table 10.
7.1 Embodiment
We can grossly identify 5 embodiment categories: standard single agent, multiple
agents, screen agents, simulated robot and real robot. The standard agent set-
ting usually concerns a (gridworld) navigation simulation in some environment
designed by the researcher. Some agents are also designed to appear on a screen
for interaction with a user (El-Nasr et al, 2000). Another group of embodiments
concern simulated or real robots. Simulated robots are based on models of exist-
ing real robots, i.e. they usually incorporate more realistic physics and continuous
controls.
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There are also real robotic implementations in navigation and resource tasks.
However, several robotic implementations (especially those involving human inter-
action) use the robot mainly as physical embodiment (without moving much, for
example in a dialogue task). Overall, most implementations have focussed on simu-
lated agents. It is important to note that most state-spaces stay relatively small, i.e.
sensory information usually has narrow bandwidth (or is assumed to be appropri-
ately pre-processed). Although this facilitates interpretation, a remaining question
is whether the current emotion modelling methods scale to high-dimensional and
complex problems.
7.2 Test scenario
Emotion implementations have been tested in different scenarios: navigation tasks
with resources and/or obstacles, multiple agent interaction settings and human-
agent/robot interaction tasks.
There is a wide variety of navigation tasks with additional (multiple) resources
and obstacles (with associated positive and negative rewards). When resources and
obstacles are non-stationary we usually see the terminology ‘prey’ and ‘predators’.
Within this group we mainly see navigation tasks with a single goal and multiple
obstacles (i.e. ‘mazes’ (Marinier and Laird, 2008) or robot navigation (Lee-Johnson
et al, 2010) (Williams et al, 2015)). A second group involves multiple resources,
which are mostly connected to underlying homeostatic systems to investigate be-
haviour switching. A few tasks also specifically include virtual enemies (Sequeira
et al, 2011) or humans with adversarial intentions (Castro-Gonza´lez et al, 2013)
(Tanaka et al, 2004).
A second, much smaller group of scenarios involves multiple agents in a social
simulation scenario, either a competitive (Von Haugwitz et al, 2012) (Yu et al,
2015) or co-operative one (Matsuda et al, 2011). The third category tests their im-
plementation in interaction with humans. This can either involve a human dialogue
task (Ficocelli et al, 2015) (Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann, 2013) or physical
interaction with a human (Blanchard and Canamero, 2005) (Shibata et al, 1997).
In general, most papers have constructed their own scenario. We have not seen
any test scenarios being borrowed from other emotion-learning implementations,
nor from the general reinforcement learning literature. This makes it hard to com-
pare different implementations amongst each other.
7.3 Main results
Finally, we discuss what empirical results were found by the various authors. We
identify three main categories in which emotions may be useful to the agent:
learning efficiency, emotion dynamics and human-robot interaction (HRI) (Table
10, third column).
Learning efficiency. Most authors in emotion-RL research have focussed on learn-
ing efficiency (see Table 10). Overall, emotions have been found beneficial in a
variety of learning tasks. Agents with emotional functionality achieved higher av-
erage rewards (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001; Sequeira et al, 2014; Yu et al, 2015) or
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learned faster (Marinier and Laird, 2008; Ahn and Picard, 2006; Zhang and Liu,
2009). Others researchers focussed on the ability to avoid specific negative rewards,
like the ability to avoid collisions (Gadanho and Hallam, 2001; Lee-Johnson et al,
2010) and navigate away from obstacles (Shi et al, 2012). Other researchers report
improved behaviour switching, where emotional agents better alternate between
goals (Cos et al, 2013; Hasson et al, 2011; Goerke, 2006). Finally, some authors
specifically show improved exploration (Broekens et al, 2007b). Many authors that
focussed on learning performance do compare to a non-emotional baseline agent,
which is of course a necessary comparison. Altogether, the results show emotions
may be a useful inspiration to improve learning performance of RL agents.
Emotion dynamics. A second group of researchers focusses on emotion dynamics,
usually comparing the emergent emotion signals to known psychological theories.
For example, Jacobs et al (2014) showed patterns of habituation and extinction,
Moren and Balkenius (2000) reproduced blocking, while Blanchard and Canamero
(2005) observed approach and avoidance behaviour in their emotional agent. Other
researchers qualitatively interpret whether the emotion dynamics fit the (social)
interaction (Tanaka et al, 2004) (Moussa and Magnenat-Thalmann, 2013) or occurs
at appropriate states in the scenario (Moerland et al, 2016). Altogether, results
in this category show that emotion in RL agents might be a viable tool to study
emotion theories in computational settings.
Human-robot interaction. Finally, a third group of researchers focusses on human-
robot interaction evaluation. Their primary focus is to show how emotions may
benefit social interaction with humans, usually by taking questionnaires with the
participants after the experiment. Participants of Ficocelli et al (2015) report more
effective communication, participants of El-Nasr et al (2000) found the agent more
convincing, and participants of Shibata et al (1997) report an increased notion of
connection as well as increased perception of robot intelligence. Kim and Kwon
(2010) describe an enhanced pleasant feeling of the participant after the human-
agent interaction. Therefore, there is clear indication that emotion in RL agents
may benefit an interactive learning setting. However, there are relatively few papers
in this category compared to the other two, and this may be a direction for more
research.
8 Discussion
This article surveyed the available work on emotion and reinforcement learning
in agents and robots, by systematically categorizing emotion elicitation, type and
function in RL agents. We first summarize the main results and identify the chal-
lenges encountered throughout the article.
Emotions have been elicited from extrinsic motivation (in combination with
homeostasis), intrinsic motivation (in combination with appraisal), value and re-
ward functions and as hard-wired implementation. We want to emphasize again
that extrinsic motivation and homeostasis are not synonyms, nor are intrinsic mo-
tivations and appraisal (see Section 3). The hard-wired emotion elicitation seems
least useful, as it does not provide any deeper understanding about emotion gen-
eration, and is by definition hand-crafted to the task. The other three elicitation
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methods are useful and appear to address different aspects of emotions. Home-
ostasis focusses on the inner resource status, appraisal on the inner model status
and value/reward focusses on the learning process. They seem to cover different
aspects of emotions. For example, surprise seems only elicitable from a model, joy
from food requires extrinsic motivation and homeostasis, while aspects like antici-
pated change need value functions. Finally, note that there remains slight overlap
among categories, i.e. they serve as a framework, but are not mutually exclusive.
This is also illustrated by the overlap among implementations in Table 7.
Regarding emotion types we observed a relatively larger corpus of categori-
cal implementations than dimensional models. Although dimensional models are
appealing from an engineering perspective, they are usually implemented in 1D
(valence) or 2D (valence-arousal) space. This makes it challenging to implement
a diverse set of emotions. We do want to present a hypothesis here: dimensional
and categorical emotions may fit into the same framework, but at different levels.
Concepts like ‘well-being’, as encountered throughout this survey, do not appear
to be categorical emotions, but could be interpreted as valence. However, an agent
can have categorical emotions on top of a well-being/valence system, joining both
emotion types in one system. Similarly, arousal could be related to the speed of
processing of the RL loop, also entering the RL process at a different level.
Finally, emotion function could involve nearly every node in the RL loop:
reward, state, value function and action selection. It seems like all approaches
are useful, as each element targets a different RL challenge. The fifth emotion
function category (epiphenomenon) should get more attention because it involves
a different kind of usefulness (communicative). Although quite some papers are
focussing on emotion dynamics, there is less work on evaluating the potential
of emotions to communicate the learning process. Thomaz and Breazeal (2006)
found that transparency of the learner’s internal process (in their case through
the robot’s gaze direction) can improve the human’s teaching. We hypothesize
emotional communication to express internal state may serve a similar role, which
is a topic that could get more research attention in the future.
Advice for implementation. We expect this article is useful to engineers who want
to implement emotional functionality in their RL-based agent or robot. We advise
to first consider what type of functionality is desired. When the goal is to have
emotions visualize agent state, or have believable emotions to enhance empathy
and user investment, then emotions can be implemented as an epiphenomenon (i.e.
focus on Sections 4 and 5). The reader could for example first decide on the desired
emotion types, and then check which available elicitation methods seem applicable
(e.g. via Table 9). When one desires emotion function in their agent/robot as well,
then Section 6 becomes relevant. We advise the reader to first consider the desired
functionality, e.g. a more adaptive reward function, learning parameter tuning, or
modulated exploration, and then work ‘backwards’ to emotion type and emotion
elicitation. Readers may verify whether there are existing implementations of their
requirements through the colour coding in Table 9.
In general, we believe researchers in the field should start focussing on integrat-
ing approaches. This survey intended to provide a framework and categorization of
emotion elicitation and function, but it seems likely that these categories actually
jointly occur in the behavioural loop. We look forward to systems that integrate
multiple approaches. Moreover, we want to emphasize the paper by Williams et al
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(2015) that took a fully learned approach. Their system contains nodes that were
trained for their functional benefit, and later on characterized for the emotion pat-
terns. We expect such an approach to both be more robust against the complexity
problems encountered when developing integrated systems, and to transfer more
easily between problem settings as well.
Testing and quality of the field. We also systematically categorized the testing sce-
narios and evaluation criteria (Section 7 and Table 10). There are several points to
be noted about the current testing. First we want to stress a point already made
by Can˜amero (2003), who noted that ‘one should not put more emotion in the
agent than what is required by the complexity of the system-environment interac-
tion’. Many of the current implementations design their own (grid) world. While
these artificial worlds are usually well-suited to assess optimization behaviour, it
is frequently hard to assess which emotions should be elicited by the agent at each
point in the world. On the other hand, more realistic scenarios quickly become
high-dimensional, and therefore the challenge changes to a representation learn-
ing problem. Potentially, the advances in solving more complex AI scenarios with
(deep) RL (Silver et al, 2016; Mnih et al, 2015) may provide more realistic test
scenarios in the future as well.
There are two other important observations regarding testing and evaluation.
We have not encountered any (emotional) scenario being reproduced by other
researchers. This appears to us as an important problem. To enhance the stan-
dard of the field, researchers should start reproducing scenarios from other’s work
to compare with, or borrow from different RL literature. The second topic we
want to emphasize is the use of different evaluation criteria. Researchers should
choose whether they target learning efficiency, emotion dynamics or HRI criteria.
If learning performance is your criterion, then your implementation must include
a baseline. When you focus on emotion dynamics, then you should try to validate
by a psychological theory, or ideally compare to empirical (human) data. When
you focus on human interaction criteria, then this should usually involve a ques-
tionnaire. Although questionnaires seems to be consistent practice already, we did
observe authors reporting on a smaller subset of the questions (i.e. posing the risk
to have a few results pop out by statistical chance).
This brings us to a final problem in the field, being the thoroughness of the pa-
pers. Frequently we were unable to fully deduce the details of each implementation.
Indeed a full system description with all the details requires valuable space, but
on the other hand, a well-informed colleague reading a conference paper should be
able to reproduce your results. Only listing the homeostatic/appraisal variables
and the emotions that were implemented does not provide deeper understand-
ing about how the system works. This also makes it harder to compare between
implementations. Differences in notational conventions and slight differences in
definitions further complicate comparisons. Paying attention to these aspects of
reproducibility, for example sticking to conventional RL notation (Sutton and
Barto, 1998), will facilitate broader uptake of the work in this field.
Future. A core challenge for the future will be to integrate all aspects into one
larger system, potentially taking a fully learned approach. Along the same line, it
is a remaining challenge of this field (and AI in general) to translate higher-level
(psychological) concepts into implementable mathematical expressions. Examples
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of such translations can be found in Equations 9-13, and we expect comparing
different translations may help identify more consensus. At least the RL framework
provides a common language to start comparing these translations.
With social robots increasingly positioned at our research horizon, we expect
interest in emotion in functional agents to increase in the forthcoming years. How-
ever, the current implementations seldomly investigate the full social interaction.
Although this is a very high-level AI challenge, we believe research should fo-
cus in this direction to show empirical success. This involves all aspects of RL
in a social context, i.e. robots learning from human demonstration (LfD) (Argall
et al, 2009), learning from human feedback (possibly emotional (Broekens, 2007)),
human emotions influencing agent emotions, and agent emotions communicating
internal processes back to humans.
From an affective modelling perspective, it is promising to see how a cogni-
tive theory like appraisal theory turns out to be well-applicable to MDP settings.
Apart from integrating important lines of emotion and learning research, this also
illustrates how cognitive and learning theories are not mutually exclusive. We hope
the affective modelling community will start to benefit from the literature on in-
trinsic motivation in RL as well (Bratman et al, 2012). A crucial requisite herein
will be improving the types of problems that (model-based) RL can solve. Many
scenarios that are interesting from an affective modelling viewpoint, for example
high-dimensional social settings, are still challenging for RL. Advances in deep
reinforcement learning (Mnih et al, 2015) might make more complex scenarios
available soon. However, for affective modelling we especially need the transition
function and model-based RL (Deisenroth and Rasmussen, 2011). Recent work has
also shown the feasibility of high-dimensional transition function approximation
(Oh et al, 2015) in stochastic domains (Moerland et al, 2017) under uncertainty
(Houthooft et al, 2016). Further progress in this direction should make the ideas
covered in this survey applicable to more complicated scenarios as well.
9 Conclusion
This article surveyed emotion modelling in reinforcement learning (RL) agents.
The literature has been structured according to the intrinsically motivated RL
framework. We conclude by identifying the main benefits encountered in this work
for the machine learning (ML), human-robot interaction (HRI), and affective mod-
elling (AM) communities. For machine learning, emotion may benefit learning effi-
ciency by providing inspiration for intrinsic motivation, exploration and for meta-
parameter tuning. The current results should stimulate further cross-over between
(intrinsic) motivation, model-based RL and emotion-RL research. For HRI re-
search, emotions obviously are important for social interaction. More work should
be done on implementing emotion models in interactive reinforcement learning
algorithms, for which the survey presents a practical guideline on implementing
emotions in RL agents. For affective modelling, we conclude that cognitive theories
(like appraisal theory) can well be expressed in RL agents. The general benefits
of RL agents (they require little assumptions, are easily applicable to all kinds
of domains, and allow for learning) make them a promising test-bed for affec-
tive modelling research. This survey identifies opportunities for future work with
respect to implementation and evaluation of emotion models in RL agents.
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Table 9: Systematic overview of emotion elicitation, emotion type and emotion func-
tion in the reinforcement learning loop (see Figure 1). Papers are ordered by their
elicitation method (first column). Note that for homeostatic specification, we try to
use the terms mentioned in the original paper, which may sometimes refer to the
drive (i.e. the deficit in homeostatic variable) rather than the homeostatic dimen-
sion itself. Colour coding is based on the first term mentioned in each cell, grouping
the categories as encountered in Sections 4-6 and Table 1.
Paper Emotion Elicitation Emotion Type Emotion Function
(Gadanho
and Hal-
lam,
1998,
2001)
Homeostasis: hunger,
pain, restlessness, tem-
perature, eating, smell,
warmth, proximity
Categorical: happiness,
sadness, fear, anger
Reward modification:
positive emotion is
reward
(Gadanho,
2003)
Homeostasis: energy, wel-
fare, activity
Dimensional: well-being Reward modification:
delta well-being is re-
ward
(Cos
et al,
2013)
Homeostasis: hunger,
tiredness, restlessness
Categorical: hedonic
value
Reward modification:
delta well-being is re-
ward
(Coutinho
et al,
2005)
Homeostasis: blood
sugar, energy, pain, vas-
cular volume, endorphine
Dimensional: wellness,
relaxation, fatigue
Epiphenomenon
(Von
Haugwitz
et al,
2012)
Homeostasis: hunger, fa-
tigue, interest
Categorical: happiness,
sadness, anger, surprise,
fear, disgust.
Metalearning: reward =
delta happiness, learning
rate = (1-surprise), dis-
count factor = (1-fear),
Boltzmann temperature
= anger
(Tanaka
et al,
2004)
Homeostasis: hunger,
fullness, pain, comfort,
fatigue, sleepiness
Categorical: happiness,
sadness, anger, surprise,
disgust, fear, neutral
Epiphenomenon: gesture,
voice, facial expression
(Goerke,
2006)
Homeostasis: fatigue,
hunger, homesickness,
curiosity
Categorical: happiness,
fear, anger, boredom
Reward modification:
positive emotion is
reward
(Sequeira
et al,
2011,
2014)
Appraisal: valency, con-
trol, novelty, motivation
None Reward modification:
summed appraisals
added to reward function
(Marinier
and
Laird,
2008)
Appraisal: suddenness,
intrinsic pleasantness,
relevance, conducive-
ness, discrepancy from
expectation, control,
power.
None Reward modification:
summed appraisals is
reward
(Yu et al,
2015,
2013)
Appraisal: social fairness
Value: average reward
Categorical: happiness,
sadness, fear, anger
Reward modification:
positive/negative emo-
tion is positive/negative
reward
(Lee-
Johnson
et al,
2010,
2007)
Appraisal: model mis-
match
Value: average achieved
reward, global planned
reward
Homeostatic: collision
Categorical: Happiness,
sadness, fear, anger, sur-
prise
Reward modification:
change local reward
(happy & suprise higher,
fear & anger lower)
(Williams
et al,
2015)
Appraisal: novelty,
progress, control, uncer-
tainty
Homeostatic: pain.
Categorical: happiness,
fear (post-characterized)
Metalearning: happy
gives positive reward
bias and higher travel
speed, fear giver negative
reward bias and lower
travel speed
(Si et al,
2010)
Appraisal: motivational
relevance & congruence,
accountability, control,
novelty.
None Epiphenomenon
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(Kim and
Kwon,
2010)
Appraisal: unexpected-
ness, motive consistency,
control, uncertainty,
agency/accountability..
Dimensional: valence,
arousal (not fully ex-
plicit)
Epiphenomenon: facial
avatar, voice, movement
of ears, music
(Hasson
et al,
2011)
Appraisal: non-progress
Human affective state
Categorical: frustration,
anger, happiness
Action selection: switch
between targets
(Moussa
and
Magnenat-
Thalmann,
2013)
Appraisal: desirability,
attachment (OCC model)
Categorical: joy, dis-
tress, happy for, resent-
ment, sorry for, gloating,
gratitude, admiration,
anger, reproach.
Reward modification:
reward is difference of
largest positive and
negative current emotion
(Huang
et al,
2012)
Appraisal: motivational
relevance + goal reach-
able
Categorical: Happy, sad,
anger, surprise, fear,
frustration
Epiphenomenon
(Kuremoto
et al,
2013)
Appraisal: distance to
goal, continuation of
eliciting event
Dimensional: valence,
arousal
Action selection: sepa-
rate emotional Q-value as
part of total summed Q-
value
(Castro-
Gonza´lez
et al,
2013;
Salichs
and
Malfaz,
2012)
Value: worst historical
Q-value +
Homeostasis: energy,
boredom, calm, loneli-
ness
Categorical: happiness,
sadness, fear
Reward modification:
delta well-being
State modification: fear
replaces dominant moti-
vation (when threshold is
exceeded)
(Ahn and
Picard,
2006)
Reward: difference be-
tween experienced reward
and expected immediate
reward of best two avail-
able actions
Dimensional: feeling
good, bad
Action selection: emo-
tional Q-value is part of
total Q-value
(Zhang
and Liu,
2009)
Reward: difference be-
tween experienced reward
and expected immediate
reward of best action
Dimensional: feeling
good/bad
Action selection: emo-
tional Q-value is part of
total Q-value
(Broekens
et al,
2007a,b)
Reward: short versus long
term average reward
Dimensional: valence Action selection: emotion
tunes exploration param-
eter and simulation depth
(Moerland
et al,
2016)
Value: Anticipated tem-
poral difference
Categorical: hope, fear Epiphenomenon
(Jacobs
et al,
2014)
Value: temporal dif-
ference and posi-
tive/negative part of
value
Categorical: joy, dis-
tress, hope, fear
Epiphenomenon
(Bozinovski,
1982)
Value None Epiphenomenon
(Moren
and
Balke-
nius,
2000)
Value None Epiphenomenon
(Lahnstein,
2005)
Value: temporal differ-
ence
Categorical: happiness,
sadness, hope.
Epiphenomenon
(Obayashi
et al,
2012)
Reward: not explicit
Hard-wired: not-explicit
Dimensional: valence,
arousal (with unlabelled
categories)
State modification: emo-
tion specific Q-value
(Matsuda
et al,
2011)
Reward: only negative re-
ward
Categorical: fear Action selection: separate
emotional value function
is part of action selection
(Schweighofer
and
Doya,
2003;
Doya,
2002)
Reward: mid versus long-
term average reward
None Metalearning: perturba-
tion of discount, learning
and temperature parame-
ter based on emotion.
32 Moerland et al.
(Hogewoning
et al,
2007)
Reward: short/mid ver-
sus long-term average re-
ward
Dimensional: valence Action selection: emotion
tunes exploration (com-
bines (Broekens et al,
2007b) and (Schweighofer
and Doya, 2003) with chi-
square test)
(Shi et al,
2012)
Reward: change in re-
ward signal
Categorical: joy, fear,
anger, relief
Metalearning: joy = TD,
anger = temperature,
fear = learning rate, re-
lief = discount parameter
(connection not explicit)
(Blanchard
and
Canamero,
2005)
Reward: average Categorical: comfort Metalearning: emotion
modulates the learning
rate
(El-Nasr
et al,
2000)
Value: combined with
fuzzy logic
Categorical: joy, sad-
ness, disappointment,
relief, hope, fear, pride,
shame, reproach, anger,
gratitude, gratification,
remorse
Action selection: emo-
tions are input to a fuzzy
logic action selection sys-
tem
(Kubota
and Wak-
isaka,
2010)
Hard-wired: from objects
(users, balls, chargers,
obstacles), speech and
previous emotional state
Categorical: happiness,
sadness, fear, anger
Action selection: switch
between value functions
(Ayesh,
2004)
Hard-wired: from state
through fuzzy cognitive
maps
Dimensional: restless,
neutral, stable
State modification: emo-
tion specific Q-values
(Ficocelli
et al,
2015)
Human affective state
Hard-wired
Categorical: happiness,
neutral, sadness, angry.
State modification
Action selection: modify
intonation of speech
(Hoey
and
Schro¨der,
2015)
Hard-wired from object
observations (social inter-
action)
Dimensional: valence,
control, arousal
State modification: ex-
tended POMDP deriva-
tion with 3D emotional
state
(Tsankova,
2002)
Hardwired: from obstacle
detectors
Categorical: frustration Action selection: emotion
controls the balancing be-
tween value functions
(Zhou
and Cog-
gins,
2002)
Hardwired: from sight of
resources
Homeostasis: hunger,
thirst (not connected to
emotion but to reward)
None Reward modification:
reward calculated from
maximum emotion or
motivation.
(Doshi
and Gmy-
trasiewicz,
2004)
Hard-wired: from sight of
enemy or resource.
Categorical: Contented,
elation, fear, panic.
Action selection: emotion
adjust planning depth
and biases considered ac-
tions
(Gmytrasiewicz
and
Lisetti,
2002)
Hard-wired: Markovian
transition from previous
emotions and state
Categorical: Coopera-
tive, slightly annoyed,
angry
Meta-learning: emotion
biases transition function
Action selection: emotion
biases available action
subset, biases value
function
(Guojiang
et al,
2010)
Hard-wired: from exte-
rior incentive like safety,
threat, fancy, surprise
(assumed pre-given)
Dimensional: valence,
arousal
State modification: 2D
emotional state space
Reward modification:
agent should move to de-
sirable area in emotional
space (implementation
not specified)
(Shibata
et al,
1997)
Not explicit Not explicit Not explicit
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Table 10: Systematic overview of test embodiment, scenario, evaluation criterion
and main results. Papers are ordered according to Table 9. Colour coding presented
for the evalution criterion column.
Paper Embodi-
ment
Scenario Criterion Main result
(Gadanho
and Hal-
lam, 1998,
2001;
Gadanho,
2003)
Simulated
robot
Multiple
resource
task
Learning Less collisions and higher average reward
with emotional agent.
(Cos et al,
2013)
Grid-
world
agent
Multiple
resource
task
Learning Emergent behavioural cycles fulfilling
different drives
(Coutinho
et al,
2005)
Grid-
world
agent
Multiple
resource
task
- No emotion results
(Von
Haugwitz
et al,
2012)
Multiple
agents
Game /
competi-
tion
Learning Increased average reward compared to
non-emotional agents
(Tanaka
et al,
2004)
Real
robot
Human
interacting
( hitting/
padding
robot)
Dynamics Appropriate emotion response (fear and
joy) to bad and good acting person.
(Goerke,
2006)
Simulated
robot +
real robot
Multiple
resource
task
Learning Different behaviour types with emotion
functionality
(Sequeira
et al,
2011)
Grid-
world
agent
Resource-
predator
task
Learning Improved average fitness compared to
non-appraisal agent
(Marinier
and Laird,
2008)
Grid-
world
agent
Maze Learning Emotional agent needs less learning
episodes
(Yu et al,
2015,
2013)
Multiple
agents
Game / ne-
gotiation
Learning Emotional/social agents have higher av-
erage reward and show co-operation
(Lee-
Johnson
et al,
2010,
2007)
Simulated
robot
Navigation
task
Learning Emotional agent has less collisions and
more exploration, against a higher aver-
age travel time
(Williams
et al,
2015)
Real
robot
Navigation
task
Learning Less collisions with fear enabled, more
exploration with surprise, quicker routes
with happiness enabled.
(Si et al,
2010)
Multiple
agents
Social
interaction
Dynamics Different appraisal with deeper planning
+ Social accountability realistically de-
rived (compared to other computational
model).
(Kim and
Kwon,
2010)
Real
robot
Social in-
teraction
(question
game) with
human
HRI Users report higher subjective feeling
of interaction and higher pleasantness
for emotional robot + humans correctly
identify part of the underlying robot ap-
praisals based on a questionnaire
(Hasson
et al,
2011)
Real
robot
Multiple
resource
navigation
task
Learning Robot with emotion can switch between
drives (in case of obstacles) and escape
deadlocks.
(Moussa
and
Magnenat-
Thalmann,
2013)
Real
robot
Human
dialogue
task (while
playing
game)
Dynamics
+ Learn-
ing
Appropriate emotion responses to
friendly and unfriendly users + learn
different attitudes towards them.
(Huang
et al,
2012)
Grid-
world
agent
Navigation
task
Dynamics Dynamics show how emotion elicitation
varies with planning depth and goal
achievement probability.
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(Kuremoto
et al,
2013)
Grid-
world
agent
Predator
task
Learning Quicker goal achievement for emotional
agent compared to non-emotional agent.
(Castro-
Gonza´lez
et al,
2013;
Salichs
and Mal-
faz, 2012)
Real
robot
Multiple
resources
task in-
cluding
human
objects
Learning
+ Dy-
namics
Less harmful interactions compared to
non-fear robot + realistic fear dynamics
(compared to animal)
(Ahn and
Picard,
2006)
Agent Conditioning
experiment
Learning Affective agent learns optimal policy
faster.
(Zhang
and Liu,
2009)
Simulated
robot
Navigation
task
Learning Emotional robot needs less trials to learn
the task.
(Broekens
et al,
2007a,b)
Grid-
world
agent
Maze Learning Emotional control of simulation depth
improves average return. Emotional con-
trol of exploration improves time to goal
and time to find the global optimum.
(Moerland
et al,
2016)
Grid-
world
agent +
Pacman
Resource-
predator
task
Dynamics Appropriate hope and fear anticipation
in specific Pacman scenarios.
(Jacobs
et al,
2014)
Grid-
world
agent
Maze Dynamics Emotion dynamics (habituation, extinc-
tion) simulated realistically compared to
psychological theory.
(Bozinovski,
1982;
Bozi-
novski
et al,
1996)
Grid-
world
agent
Maze Learning First investigation of emotion as primary
reward, shows agent is able to solve maze
task.
(Moren
and Balke-
nius, 2000;
Balke-
nius and
More´n,
1998)
Agent Conditioning
experiment
Dynamics Agent shows habituation, extinction,
blocking (i.e. of learning signal, not emo-
tion)
(Lahnstein,
2005)
Real-
robot
Multiple
objects
grasping
task
Dynamics Models dynamics within single decision
cycle, shows plausible anticipation, hedo-
nic experience and subsequent decay.
(Obayashi
et al,
2012)
Grid-
world
agent
Maze Learning Emotional agent needs less steps to goal
(ordinary agent does not converge).
(Matsuda
et al,
2011)
Multiple
agent
grid-
world
Co-
operation
task
Learning Emotional agents show more co-
operation and adapt better to envi-
ronmental change compared to non-
emotional agents.
(Schweighofer
and Doya,
2003;
Doya,
2002)
Agent Conditioning
experiment
+ Sim-
ulated
pendulum
Learning Dynamic adaptation of meta-parameters
in both static and dynamic environ-
ment. Task not achieved for fixed meta-
parameters.
(Hogewoning
et al,
2007)
Grid-
world
agent
Maze Learning Emotional agent cannot improve results
of (Broekens et al, 2007b; Schweighofer
and Doya, 2003)
(Shi et al,
2012)
Grid-
world
agent
Obstacle
and re-
source
task
Learning
+ Dy-
namics
Emotional agent avoids obstacle better.
Different emotion lead to different paths.
(Blanchard
and
Canamero,
2005)
Real
robot
Conditioning
task
Dynamics Robot can imprint desirable stimuli
based on comfort (reward) signal, and
subsequently show approach or avoidance
behaviour.
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(El-Nasr
et al,
2000)
Screen
agent
Human
interaction
task
HRI Users perceive agent with emotional ac-
tion selection as more convincing.
(Kubota
and Wak-
isaka,
2010)
Simulated
robot
Multiple
objects and
human
Dynamics Emotional robot avoids dangerous areas
due to fear, and starts exploring when
happy.
(Ayesh,
2004)
Real
robot
None None None
(Ficocelli
et al,
2015)
Real
robot
Human di-
alogue task
HRI +
Dynam-
ics +
Learning
Effective emotion expression (user ques-
tionnaire) + Robot changing emotions to
satisfy different drives
(Hoey and
Schro¨der,
2015)
Agent Social
agent
interaction
Dynamics Model can accurately modify own dimen-
sional emotion with respect to the client
it is interacting with.
(Tsankova,
2002)
Simulated
robot
Navigation
task.
Learning Emotional robot reaches goal more often,
but need more timesteps.
(Zhou and
Coggins,
2002)
Real
robot
Multiple
resources
Learning Emotional robot has higher average re-
ward and less intermediate behaviour
switching compared to non-emotional
robot.
(Doshi
and Gmy-
trasiewicz,
2004)
Grid-
world
Multiple
resource,
predator
task
Learning Emotional agent (with meta-learning)
has higher average return compared to
non-emotional agent.
(Gmytrasiewicz
and
Lisetti,
2002)
None None (the-
oretical
model)
None None
(Guojiang
et al,
2010)
Agent Conditioning
task
Dynamics Agent moves towards beneficial emo-
tional state-space and stays there.
(Shibata
et al,
1997)
Real
robot
Human
stroke/pad
robot
HRI Humans reported a coupling with the
robot, some reported it as intelligent.
Subjects report positive emotions them-
selves.
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